Daniel Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Daniel Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Hasenyager; Peter W. Summerill; Hasenyager & Summerill; Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellee.
David G. Williams; Rodney R. Parker; Terence L. Rooney; Snow, Christensen, & Martineau;
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, No. 20051087 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6156
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DANIEL CARTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON ) 
BEHALF OF THE HEIRS OF MARJORIE ) 
CARTER AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
MARJORIE CARTER, ; 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, ) 
v. ; 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CEN- ; 
TER, ; 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, ; 
AND ; 
CRESTWOOD CARE CENTER, ; 
DEFENDANT. ; 
i CASE No. 2005-1087-SC 
i DISTRICT CT. NO. 050901842 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
PETER W. SUMMERILL 
HASENYAGER & SUMMERILL 
1004 24TH STREET 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 621-3662 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
TERENCE L. ROONEY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant/AppeUanL. AppELLAiE COUR 
MAY 3 1 2006 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DANIEL CARTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON 
BEHALF OF THE HEIRS OF MARJORIE 
CARTER AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF 
MARJORIE CARTER, 
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLEE, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CEN-
TER, 
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT, 
AND 
CRESTWOOD CARE CENTER, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. 2005- 1087-SC 
DISTRICT CT. NO. 050901842 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
PETER W. SUMMERILL 
HASENYAGER & SUMMERILL 
1004 24TH STREET 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801)621-3662 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
TERENCE L. ROONEY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. PLAiiNliFF o ARGUMENTS REGARDING ! EGISLATIVE 
INTENT ARE NOT PERSUASIVE 1 
II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT IN THE STATUTE ARE 
UNPERSUASIVF 4 
CONCLUSION 5 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Board of County Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice, 438 So.2d 
392 (Fl. 1983) 3 
Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Com'n, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) 1 
Hoffman v. Bos, 56 Mich. App. 448, 224 N.W.2d 107 (1974) 2 
Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 108 111. App. 3d 191, 438 
N.E.2d 1299 (1982) 3 
Peaceman v. Cades, 272 Pa. Super. 568, 416 A.2d 1042 (1979) 3, 4 
State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 31 P.3d 547 2 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-502 1,4 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-13-7 1,4 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2004 Utah Laws ch. 267 §§ 19, 49 1 
-ii-
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVE IN-
TENT ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. 
Plaintiff begins by arguing that there is nothing in the legislative history of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 63-30d-502[ to affirmatively suggest that the Legislature intended to sup-
plant § 78-13-7 in multi-defendant cases. In fact, however, the legislative history is silent 
on this point. It equally supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended the oppo-
site result, and it is more logical to conclude that the Legislature, in adopting a compre-
hensive statutory scheme dealing with claims against the government, intended the Act to 
operate as a unified whole. 
Accordingly, the University's argument focuses, within that context, on rules of 
statutory construction. Such rules are useful to tease out legislative intent when there are 
no direct statements of intent. Here, the venue provision under the Governmental Immu-
nity Act is more specific in application than the general venue statute, and the construc-
tion urged on the Court by the plaintiff renders the provision of § 63-30d-502 allowing 
venue "in the county in which the claim arose" redundant of § 78-13-7, and thus super-
fluous. Plaintiff's arguments violate longstanding rules of statutory construction. 
1
 Plaintiff argues that the predecessor to § 63-30d-502 is applicable to this case because 
the decedent died prior to enactment of § 63-30d-502. Section 63-30d-502 became effec-
tive July 1, 2004. 2004 Utah Laws ch. 267 §§ 19, 49. Because the statute governs the 
process for bringing a claim, rather than the substance of the claim itself, it applies to 
cases filed after the effective date. Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Com'n, 725 P.2d 
1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1986). In this case, the filing date of the complaint, not the dece-
dent's date of death, controls, and § 63-30d-502 is the applicable statute. 
In support of his argument, plaintiff cites Hoffman v. Bos, 56 Mich. App. 448, 224 
N.W.2d 107 (1974). That case was a suit against joint tortfeasors, one of which was a 
political subdivision. The subdivision asserted that venue was proper only in the county 
where it was established. The case did not turn on an effort to ascertain and implement 
legislative intent. Rather, it turned on a conflict between a statute and a court rule. The 
court held that the rule prevailed over the statute, because the rule was procedural in na-
ture and thus within the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional jurisdiction: 
The above background of the code and analysis thereof suggests that 
the issue posed in the instant case is not a conflict between two statutory 
provisions but rather is a conflict between the court rule and the statute. 
This being so, the court rule should prevail. It is well established that 
Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
over matters of practice and procedure. Where a rule conflicts with a stat-
ute on such matters the rule prevails. 
224 N.W.2d at 453 (citations omitted). 
The case at bar differs from the Hoffman case. In the case at bar, the Court is 
faced with the task of harmonizing two statutory provisions. It cannot, as the Hoffman 
court was able to do, resort to the primacy of one type of authority over another. It is 
well-settled in Utah that the Court's "fundamental duty" is to ferret out the meanings of 
the two statutory enactments and to give meaning to both to the extent possible. State v. 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73 \ 11, 31 P.3d 547. In this case, the University offers a clear rec-
onciliation of the two statutes that gives meaning to both without rendering any provi-
sions superfluous, and that is consistent with the apparent legislative intent of the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act. 
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Plaintiff next cites Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 108 111. App. 3d 191, 
438 N.E.2d 1299 (1982). In that case, the court essentially disregarded the statutory lan-
guage in favor of a public policy resolution of the issue presented. While the court had 
its reasons for doing so, its ruling cannot be reconciled with the obligation recognized by 
Utah courts to defer to legislative enactments and to give them meaning wherever possi-
ble. In this sense, the Lawless case is appropriately named. 
The Florida case cited by plaintiff, Board of County Commissioners of Madison 
County v. Grice, 438 So.2d 392 (Fl. 1983), involved the unusual situation where "two 
governmental entities residing in different counties [were] sued as joint tortfeasors and 
the actions [were] unseverable." 438 So.2d at 393. That is not the case here. 
Finally, plaintiff cites Peaceman v. Cades, 272 Pa. Super. 568, 416 A.2d 1042 
(1979). That case attempts to ascertain the meaning of the applicable rule of civil proce-
dure without doing violence to the requirement that all parts of the rule be given effect. 
The Pennsylvania rule, however, differed from the Utah statute in that it specifically ad-
dressed cases against the Commonwealth within the same statute that dealt with joint 
tortfeasors: 
"An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two 
or more defendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party 
defendant, may be brought against all defendants in any county in which 
the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants 
416 A.2d at 1044 (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c)). Elsewhere in the rules, the term "Com-
monwealth" was used distinctly from the term "political subdivision." The court found 
this significant, and held that the term "Commonwealth" as used in Rule 1006(c) did not 
S-
include political subdivisions. Id. This result is consistent with the Utah approach and 
with the approach the University advocates in this case. 
In this case, subsections (1) and (2) of § 63-30d-502 address special situations 
with the word "may." Subsection (3) is the broader provision and uses the word "shall." 
The proper interpretation of these sections is that any case not fitting within (1) or (2) 
must be brought pursuant to (3). In other words, (1) and (2) are permissive exceptions to 
the mandatory requirement of (3). They are not stand-alone venue provisions. This is the 
only interpretation consistent with the purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act, and 
which does not render a portion of § 78-13-7 superfluous. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT IN THE STATUTE ARE UN-
PERSUASIVE. 
Plaintiff disagrees with the University's explanation of the public policy objectives 
which § 63-30d-502 seeks to support. In doing so, however, plaintiff does not dispute 
that the statute is intended to limit longer absences of public officers from their official 
place of business or duty and minimizing the hampering of that duty which traveling to 
distant counties in defense of lawsuits necessitates. Indeed, the objectives are beyond 
dispute. Instead, plaintiff asserts that the objectives are not legitimate or important. 
There is a legitimate disagreement over this issue in the case law. It is not, how-
ever, the place of the courts to disregard valid enactments of the Legislature on the basis 
that the courts may disagree with the importance of the objective the Legislature seeks to 
achieve. In this case, the venue provision is one of the conditions of the waiver of immu-
nity enacted by the Legislature, and it is entitled to deference. 
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Moreover, the issue in this case is not whether or not the Legislature's objectives 
are legitimate. Rather, the issue is how to reconcile the two venue statutes at issue. In 
that context, the Legislature's objective is important as evidence of that body's intention 
in enacting § 63-30d-502, which in turn serves to help the Court ascertain the proper 
meaning to be given the statute. Apart from that narrow usage, the validity of the Legis-
lature's objectives is beyond the scope of the issues raised in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the University requests that this Court reverse the deci-
sion of the district court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the case or 
transfer it to Salt Lake County. 
DATED this 3 j d a y of May, 2006. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R. Parker 
Terence L. Rooney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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